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REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-6 (West 2004) PROVIDES 
AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE IS 
TN ADF QU ATET ,Y BRIEFED AND LACKS MERIT 
!n Coin! 1 nl'liis brief, e!e!l ixlant concedes that the "Fourth Amendment does not 
require the police to notify arrestees of charges, let alone that they are under arrest. 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S 146 [] (2004)." Aple. Br. at 8. However, he asserts that 
l h All CODE ANN & // ,' o( I ) { West ..!()() I), pr<i\'i(ies ;m ,'ilteniatne gron/ui lor al I inning 
the trial court's suppression ruling because it "requires an officer making an arrest to 
inform the person being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him." 
Aple. Br. at 8. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed and lacks merit. 
A. Defendant's Assertion of an Alternative Ground for Affirmance 
Does Not Comply With the Briefing Rule. 
Rules 24(a)(9), & 24(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, require an appellee to 
present his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented/5 including 
"citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." This Court should 
not address issues inadequately briefed under this rule. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44, Tf 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument which was inadequately brief); 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) (same). Indeed, Utah courts have 
consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be addressed on appeal. See 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). This is because c"[a] reviewing court 
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited.'" State v. 
Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988)). 
As noted above, defendant concedes that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
here, but suggests there is an alternative ground for affirmance under Section 77-7-6(1), 
governing the manner of arrest. Aple. Br. at 8. However, even assuming defendant could 
show a violation of section 77-7-6(1) on these facts, his brief is devoid of any analysis 
regarding the propriety of suppression as a remedy. See Aple. Br. at 8-9. The 
suppression remedy defendant seeks is not a given. Indeed, no section within Chapter 7 
of the Utah Code, including section 77-7-6, provides for the remedy of suppression. If 
the legislature intended suppression to be a remedy for violations of its laws governing 
2 
arrest in Chapter 7, it would have so indicated, as it did in Chapter 23, governing search 
and administrative warrants. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-212 (West 2004) (requiring 
suppression of evidence seized "pursuant to a search warrant" where the "unlawful 
conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial," meaning the search warrant "was 
obtained with malicious purpose and without probable cause or was executed maliciously 
and willfully beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity"). 
Moreover, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has considered whether 
a violation of any section in Chapter 7 warrants suppression, let alone section 77-7-6 
itself. While Utah's courts have considered whether violations of Utah's knock and 
announce statute warrant suppression, there is no per se rule.1 Rather, suppression is 
deemed an appropriate remedy for violations of the knock and announce rule only where 
the violation arises "to a fundamental violation of Fourth Amendment rights," or where 
"it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or a lack of good faith on the part of the 
police." State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1992) (holding that "[t]he erroneous 
addition of nighttime authority in the search warrant.. . did not rise to a fundamental 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights, but merely constituted a procedural violation of 
Section 77-23-5"). A violation of the knock and announce statute is not prejudicial unless 
"the search would not otherwise have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the 
!The knock and announce statute was renumbered in 1994 and is currently found at 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). 
3 
[r]ule had been followed." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Violations of the 
Fourth Amendment's knock and announce rule do not require suppression. Michigan v. 
Hudson,\26 S.Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (upholding lower court's refusal to suppress 
evidence obtained following a violation of knock and announce rule, holding that "the 
social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are 
considerable," while "the incentive to such violations is minimal.. . and the extant 
deterrences against them are substantial"). 
Defendant's failure to engage in any analysis regarding the propriety of 
suppression as a remedy for the statutory violation he alleges here is a sufficient ground 
upon which to reject his claim that section 77-7-6(1) provides an alternative ground for 
affirmance. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding "rule 24(a)(9) 
requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority"); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (holding argument "must 
contain some support for each contention"). Indeed, this Court is not a "'a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. 
Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988)); see also Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, defendant's claim should be 
rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to the 
lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to 
4 
address claim on appeal where brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to 
support his argument"). 
R. The Record Does Not Support Defendant's Assertion of a 
Statutory Violation. 
In any event, the record does not support defendant's claim of a statutory violation. 
Before an appellate court may affirm the decision appealed from on an alternative ground, 
that ground must be "'apparent on the record,'" and "it must also be sustainable by the 
factual findings of the trial court." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, % 9, 76 P.3d 1159 
(quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^  10, 52 P.3d 1158 (additional citations omitted)). 
Defendant's claim of a statutory violation is neither apparent on the record, nor 
sustainable by the trial court's factual findings. 
As noted above, section 77-7-6(1) governs the manner of arrest and requires that 
the individual effecting arrest "inform" the arrestee "of his intention, cause, and 
authority." There are three exceptions to this general requirement: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety of 
the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being arrested to 
escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or 
an attempt to commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission 
of an offense or an escape. 
All of these exceptions arguably apply here. 
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First, under subsection (l)(a), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant that 
he was under arrest because it would have been dangerous to do so. In claiming 
otherwise, defendant overlooks unfavorable findings by the trial court. In particular, the 
trial court found that defendant responded "that he 'didn't do sh-t'" when police first 
approached him, and further found that defendant refused Officer Boots' repeated 
requests to remove his hands from his pockets, and instead turned and walked away 
before refusing a final command to remove his hands, which behavior caused Officer 
Boots to be concerned for his safety. R68-69. Consequently, Officer Boots grabbed 
defendant's arm, and when defendant physically resisted, put him in a twist lock and took 
defendant to the ground. R69-70. These findings, reflecting defendant's belligerent non-
cooperation and physical resistance, together with findings demonstrating defendant's 
intoxicated condition, see R69-70, demonstrate that Officer Boots could have been 
reasonably concerned that telling defendant he was under arrest would only further 
escalate an already dangerous situation. See subsection (l)(a). 
Second, under subsection (l)(b), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant 
that he was under arrest because, as set out in Appellant's opening brief at pp. 11-14, 
defendant had committed at least one offense in the officers' presence, intoxication.2 
defendant's claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest him for intoxication 
is addressed in the State's Response to Defendant's Point II, infra. 
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Finally, under subsection (l)(c), Officer Boots was not required to tell defendant 
that he was under arrest because defendant was "pursued immediately after the 
commission of an offense or an escape." As set forth above, at the time Officer Boots 
grabbed defendant's arm here, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for at 
least intoxication.3 See Aplt. Br. at 11-14. 
Based on the above, defendant's claim that section 77-7-6(1) provides an 
alternative ground for affirmance is neither apparent in the record nor sustainable by the 
trial court's factual findings. Defendant's assertion that section 77-7-6(1) constitutes an 
alternative ground for affirmance should therefore be rejected. 
REPLY TO POINT II OF DEFENDANTS BRIEF: POLICE HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT AN INTOXICATED 
DEFENDANT MAY ENDANGER HIMSELF OR ANOTHER IN A 
PUBLIC PLACE 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that police lacked probable cause to arrest 
him for intoxication. Aple. Br. at 9-13. Defendant disputes that there was probable cause 
to believe he had committed intoxication on the grounds that, first, "[he] hadn't 
unreasonably disturbed anyone," and second, "there [was] no showing that [he] may have 
endangered himself or another." Aple. Br. at 12. Defendant suggests that both are 
elements of the intoxication statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (West 2004), which 
3See n. 2, supra. 
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must always be proven to establish the crime of intoxication. Id. As will be shown 
below, defendant misreads the intoxication statute. 
Defendant's contention that the State must always prove both that an intoxicated 
person "may endanger himself or another/' and that the intoxicated person also 
"unreasonably disturbed] other persons/' Section 76-9-701(1), is resolved under general 
principles of statutory construction. The "'primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve.'" State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 16, 137 P.3d 726 
(quoting Foutz v. City ofS. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1171) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Additionally, it is "'presume[d] that the legislature used each word 
advisedly.'"Id (quoting C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, \ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
Utah's intoxication statute provides that a person commits the crime of 
intoxication when that person "is under the influence of alcohol,... to a degree that the 
person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons." Section 76-9-701(1). Notably, the phrase, "where 
he unreasonably disturbs other persons," modifies only the immediately preceding phrase, 
"private place." Id. Accordingly, the State must show that an intoxicated person 
"unreasonably disturb [ed] other persons" only when the intoxication occurs in "a private 
place/' as opposed to "a public place." Id. 
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In other words, to obtain a conviction under the intoxication statute, the State must 
prove two elements, each of which includes two alternatives or sub-elements. The first 
element the State must prove in a prosecution for intoxication is the "danger" element, or 
that a person "is under the influence of alcohol,... to a degree that the person may [be a 
]danger[.]" Id. The State must then prove one of two sub-elements: the danger was to the 
intoxicated person (a) "himself or (b) "another." Id. 
The second element the State must show to prove intoxication is the "place" 
element, or where the intoxication occurred. This element consists of two sub-elements, 
only one of which must be proven: the intoxication occurred (a) "in a public place," or (b) 
"in a private place where [the intoxicated person] unreasonably disturbs other persons." 
Id. Thus, to obtain an intoxication conviction the State must prove (1) that an intoxicated 
person "is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that the person may endanger" 
(a) "himself or" (b) "another," and (2) that the intoxicated person was (a) "in a public 
place, or" (b) "in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
A. Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant 
May Endanger Himself or Another. 
Turning first to the "danger" element of the intoxication statute, police here had 
probable cause to believe that defendant "may endanger himself or another." Id. Indeed, 
as set forth in the response to defendant's Point I, supra, defendant was noisily stumbling 
around in the parking lot when he was discovered by police. R68-69. He was also 
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belligerent and uncooperative, and exhibited all the classic signs of intoxication. R69-70. 
In addition, police were concerned that defendant may have a weapon, the area was 
known for criminal activity, the hour was late, and busy 32nd Street was nearby. In view 
of these uncontested facts, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in failing to conclude 
that a reasonable person in Officer Boots's place would reasonably be concerned that 
defendant may present a danger to himself or others by any number of means, e.g., 
stumbling into oncoming traffic, or initiating or otherwise becoming entangled in an 
altercation. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14; see also State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ffif 37-40, 57 
P.3d 1052 (upholding Trane's arrest for intoxication in a public place based on signs of 
Trane's physical impairment and belligerent behavior). 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that there is "no record that. . . 
Officer Boots was 'reasonably concerned that defendant may stumble into oncoming 
traffic," or "that Officer Boots was concerned [ defendant might become 'entangled in a 
fight or other crime.5" Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Aplt. Br. at 14). While Officer Boots did 
not articulate these specific concerns, he did testify that 32nd Street was one of the busiest 
in that area at night, as well as a high crime vicinity. R90:9, 16, 27. These observations 
support that a reasonable officer would be concerned that an obviously intoxicated person 
like defendant may be a danger to himself, by stumbling into traffic, or to others, by 
fighting. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14. Moreover, given these obvious safety concerns, 
defendant's arrest here was reasonable, even if, as defendant suggests, Officer Boots did 
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not himself envision them at the time. See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14 (holding 
that reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts available at the time of the 
seizure would "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 
was appropriate") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Indeed, it is well 
established that the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective 
standard. See Brigham City v. Stuart,\26 S.Ct 1943, 1948 (2006) ("An action is 
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action'" (quoting 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasis added))). See also 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (same). 
B. Police Had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant's 
Intoxication Occurred in a Public Pace. 
Turning to the "place" element of the intoxication statute, police also had probable 
cause to believe that defendant committed intoxication in "public place," as opposed to a 
"private place." Section 76-9-701(1). Indeed, it is undisputed that police encountered 
defendant in a public parking lot. R68. This satisfied the second, or "place," element of 
the crime. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the State was not required to additionally show 
that defendant "unreasonably disturbed others." Section 76-9-701. As set forth above, 
this is because the phrase, "where he unreasonably disturbs other persons," modifies only 
the immediately preceding phrase, "private place." Id. Thus, the State need show that the 
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defendant "unreasonably disturbed others" only when the intoxication occurs in a "private 
place," as opposed to a "public place." Id. 
This is a correct interpretation of the intoxication statute; otherwise, there would 
have been no need for the legislature to distinguish between public and private places. 
For example, under the plain language of the statute, the legislature intended that an 
intoxicated person "in a public place" be subject to arrest whenever he "may endanger 
himself or another." Id. On the other hand, an intoxicated person "in a private place" is 
not subject to arrest until his behavior also "unreasonably disturbs other persons." Id. 
See, e.g., Stuart, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (holding that officers' warrantless entry of home was 
"plainly reasonable under the circumstances," where police "were responding, at 3 
o'clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud party"). The State's interpretation 
thus "give[s] full effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Holm, 2006 UT 31,^16 
(quotation marks and case citation omitted). 
C. Defendant's Reliance on State v. Trane Is Misplaced. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant cites State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 
1052, asserting that the Utah Supreme Court there required the State to establish both that 
Trane may have endangered himself or another, and that he also unreasonably disturbed 
others. Aple. Br. at 12. Defendant's reliance on Trane is misplaced. 
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Defendant's suggestion, that to convict for intoxication, the State must prove that 
he may have endangered himself or another, and that he also unreasonably disturbed 
others, is based on the supreme court's paraphrasing of the intoxication statute in Trane: 
"A person commits the crime of public intoxication under the Utah Code when that 
person 'is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that the person may endanger 
himself or another, in a public place . . . where he unreasonably disturbs other persons.'" 
Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 37 (quoting Section 76-9-701(1) (ellipsis in Trane)), Based on the 
supreme court's use of ellipsis, defendant suggests the supreme court read the 
intoxication statute in Trane as being conjunctive rather than disjunctive, or as requiring 
the State to always prove both that the intoxicated person in a public place may endanger 
himself or others and that the intoxicated person unreasonably disturbed others. See 
Aple. Br. at 12 ("Of importance to this case is the Court's listing of the elements of public 
intoxication."). 
However, Trane never asserted that the State had to prove that he unreasonably 
disturbed others. Specifically, like defendant, Trane's intoxication occurred in a public 
parking lot. Id. at \ 38. Unlike defendant, however, Trane challenged his arrest solely on 
the ground that there was no probable cause to believe that he had endangered himself or 
another. Id. at f 15. The supreme court rejected Trane's challenge, observing that police 
reasonably feared for their safety, given their experience that intoxicated persons could 
become violent. Id. at ^40. Additionally, Trane's behavior was "angry," and 
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"uncooperative." Id. Trane "had 'puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture 
similar to a boxer/ and initially would not release his identification card" to police. Id. 
Accordingly, the supreme court held that police correctly concluded Trane was 
intoxicated enough to pose a danger to himself or others. Id. 
Based on the above, the question of whether the phrase, "where he unreasonably 
disturbs other persons," modifies only "private place" or both "private place" and "public 
place" was not before the supreme court in Trane. Id. at % 15. Therefore, any possible 
suggestion in Trane that Utah's intoxication statute requires the State to prove the 
"unreasonably disturbs" sub-element of section 76-9-701(1), regardless of whether the 
intoxication occurrs in a "public place or a private place," is dicta. And, as further set 
forth above, it is also contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
Defendant's claim that the State had to establish that he was disturbing others even if his 
conduct occurred in a public place finds no support in Trane. 
In sum, given defendant's belligerent non-compliance and physical signs of 
intoxication while in a parking lot, see Aplt. Br. at 12-13, police had probable cause to 
believe that he may have "endangered himself or another[] in a public place." Section 76-
9-701(1). See also Trane, 2002 UT 97, ffi[ 37-40; Stuart,l26 S.Ct. at 1948; Devenpeck, 
543 U.S. at 153. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding otherwise. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's erroneous suppression of the drug evidence should be reversed. 
This case should be remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the dismissed 
charges and to allow the prosecution to proceed. 
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